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''United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Company'', 384 U.S. 394 (1966), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that "(w)hen an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply ''res judicata'' to enforce repose."〔384 U.S. at 422〕 Utah Construction established a two-part test to determine whether res judicata effect should be given to an administrative determination. First, the agency proceeding must be examined to determine whether the agency was "acting in a judicial capacity" and whether the parties had "an adequate opportunity to litigate" the issues before the agency. Second, the general rules of res judicata must be applied to the case. Not all administrative adjudications, and not all judicial determinations, are entitled to res judicata effect. For the principles of res judicata to apply, administrative determinations, like court judgments, must be valid, final and on the merits. == Background == The typical construction contract between the Government and a private contractor provides for an equitable adjustments if the government orders certain changes in the work or if the contractor encounters changed conditions differing materially from those ordinarily anticipated. It also provides that the contract shall not be terminated nor the contractor charged with liquidated damages if he is delayed in completing the work by unforeseeable conditions beyond his control.〔See Armed Services Procurement Regulations (hereinafter ASPR), 32 CFR §§ 7.602-3 to 7.602-5; Atomic Energy Commission Procurement Regulations (hereinafter AECPR), 41 CFR () § 9-7.5005-2.〕 A disputes clause will provide that "all disputes concerning questions of fact arising under this contract" shall be decided by the contracting officer subject to written appeal to the head of the department, "whose decision shall be final and conclusive upon the parties thereto."〔ASPR, 32 CFR § 7.602-6; AECPR, () 41 CFR § 9-7.5004-3.〕 Appeals from the decision of the contracting officer are characteristically heard by a board or committee designated by the head of the contracting department or agency. Should the contractor be dissatisfied with the administrative decision and bring a Tucker Act suit for breach of contract in the Court of Claims or the District Court, 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (a)(2) (1964 ed.), the finality accorded administrative fact finding by the disputes clause is limited by the provisions of the Wunderlich Act of 1954 which directs that such a decision "shall be final and conclusive unless the same is fra()dulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence."〔68 Stat. 81, 41 U. S. C. §§ 321-322 (1964 ed.).〕 With respect to this statutory provision () we held in United () States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, that where the evidentiary basis for the administrative decision is challenged in a breach of contract suit, Congress did not intend a de novo determination of the facts by the court, which must confine its review to the administrative record made at the time of the administrative appeal. A contract between a construction company and a Federal agency contained such equitable adjustment clauses determining how the parties would handle unexpected contingencies.〔 *Article 3, "Changes", dealt with changes in the work requirements; *Article 4, "Changed conditions", dealt with changed conditions differing materially from those originally anticipated; *Article 9, "Delays, Damages", provided the limited grounds for which the government could terminate the contract or charge liquidated damages to the contractor, as distinct from any "excusable delay"〕 The contract also contained such a "Disputes" clause (Article 15), which provided that a designated administrative agency (in this case, the Advisory Board of Contract Appeals) would be the "final and conclusive" arbiter of "all disputes concerning questions of fact arising under this contract" . Id at 396. When the contractor sought several adjustments under the "changed conditions" clause, the Advisory Board of Contract Appeals made the following factual determinations: #the conditions underlying one of the contractor's claims (its "Pier Drilling" claim) met the definition of a "changed condition" within the meaning of Article 4; #however, these changed conditions were not what caused the delay experienced by the contractor, thus not justifying a time extension or delay damages; #the contractor's second claim (its "Shield Window" claim) was not caused by "changed conditions" within Article 4; #the delay experienced by the contractor under this claim was the fault of neither party, thus justifying a time extension under Article 9. #the contractor's third claim, for additional compensation on account of the government providing poor quality concrete aggregate, was untimely, as it was not an issue "under the contract" but was instead for breach of contract (government-caused, unreasonable delay(damages for breach of warranty or for delay )), in which case Article 15 did not apply, the agency lacked jurisdiction, and the contractor would be entitled to sue in court. The contractor brought a breach of contract action (pursuant to the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(2) to the Court of Claims. This court held that: # both the Pier Drilling and Shield Window claims alleged unreasonable delay by the government, i.e. breach of contract; # as such claims were not "under the contract," they were not covered by the disputes clause, thus entitling the contractor to a de novo factual determination by the Court of Claims. (However, the dissenting judge felt that the contract barred de novo factual determination of these issues, as Articles 4 and 9 authorized the administrative agency to determine the cause of the delay. # if the concrete aggregate claim were for breach of contract, the contractor would be entitled to determination of the factual underlying by a judicial trial as well. # The government claimed that the disputes clause called for finality in all of the agency's findings of facts, not merely in those made in connection with disputes arising under provisions of the contract that contemplate equitable adjustments upon specified contingencies (in this case, Articles 3, 4, and 9), but in connection with "all disputes arising between the parties in the course of completing the contract." As a result, the concrete aggregate claim would not be subject to de novo factual review. # Regarding the disagreement in the Court of Claims on the Pier Drilling and Shield Window claims: : *GIVEN that it is settled under Court of Claims jurisprudence that the disputes clause comprehends disputes for which "complete relief is available under a specific contract adjustment provision" -- i.e. "disputes over rights given by the contract" -- which thus cannot be tried de novo in a suit for breach of contract, Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. United States (the agency's findings being subject to review only as permitted by the Wunderlich Act as applied in United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co.), : *and GIVEN that it is settled that the parties may sue for breach of contract "when only partial relief is available under the contract (that ) the remedies under the contract are not exclusive" (e.g. an extension of time under Article 4). :: *... in such a breach of contract suit for relief unavailable under the contract, may the parties seek de novo review of factual issues? 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co.」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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